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Cellular Telephone Detection Techniques 
 
Summary 
 
A team composed of Rick Pratt, Dave Puczyki, Kyle Bunch, Ryan Slaugh, Morris Good, and 
Doug McMakin teamed together to attempt to exploit cellular telephone features and detect if a 
person was carrying a cellular telephone into a Limited Area.  The cell phone’s electromagnetic 
properties were measured, analyzed, and tested in over 10 different ways to determine if an 
exploitable signature exists.   The method that appears to have the most potential for success 
without adding an external “tag” is to measure the RF spectrum, not in the cell phone band, but 
between 240 and 400MHz.  Figures 1- 7 show the detected signal levels from cell phones from 
three different manufacturers.    
 
Recommended Path Forward 
 
We recommend continuing the development of the cellular phone detector using the RF 
spectrum measurement approach. This approach listens for spurious emissions resulting from the 
cellular phone when it is either waiting for a call or transmitting. This approach has several 
advantages including: 
 
1. The detection method is completely passive - it does not require using an external signal 
to detect the cellular telephone. 
2. The band of frequencies identified to detect a wide variety cellular telephones is limited. 
Since the RF section of a cellular phone must produce a signal within the allocated FCC 
frequency spectrum, it is likely that manufacturers would not redesign the RF section. 
Further, a limited number of chip sets used to generate the RF are likely to be used by 
most manufacturers. Thus, spurious emissions are likely to occur at common frequencies 
among different models. Further, the fact that the channel frequencies are fixed dictates 
the oscillator frequency and the multiplier factors in order to generate these frequencies. 
3. The system would be flexible to detect more than cell phones. Most active electronics 
radiates some spurious emissions, and a system could be built to select for particular RF 
bands. Further, a system could be made to adapt to changes in technology.  
4. The system should be useful for many future generations of cellular phones. 
Manufacturers are required to satisfy FCC minimum spurious power emissions. 
However, no requirements exist to reduce these emissions to zero, even if this were 
possible. Because shielding is costly, it is likely manufacturers will continue to design to 
this minimum requirement and not below. Thus, all cellular phones are likely to have 
some level of detectable emissions even as technology advances. 
5. The system has the potential to detect a cellular phone even when it is turned off.  
However, this possibility is unlikely. A cellular telephone has some minimal electronics 
active even when turned off.  For example, it is known that a cellular phone can be set to 
wake up at a particular time; thus, at minimum, a clock must be running. If this 
electronics produces spurious emissions, it is possible to detect the phone. Additional 
testing is necessary to evaluate this option to date. 
 
At this point, we have demonstrated that spurious emissions can be detected from several 
models of cellular phones in the frequency range from 240-400 MHz. We have not 
performed a thorough analysis of these emissions, nor a thorough study of emissions from 
different model phones. Further, we have more advanced equipment that can more 
thoroughly analyze cellular phone emissions than what was available when this project 
began. Given the potential of this detection method, we propose the following path forward: 
 
1. Perform a thorough spectrum analysis of several cellular phone models. We have a real-
time spectrum analyzer that will allow us to perform analyses over a wider bandwidth. 
We will also be able to detect frequency “hopping” in order to better determine what 
frequency bands are likely to produce the best detection coverage. This effort will require 
some Labview programming in order to control the real-time spectrum analyzer. We can 
further analyze cellular phones when they are turned off to search for spurious emissions. 
2. Determine the source of spurious emissions from cellular phones. We have not 
determined if the emissions we have detected are generated from the computer 
electronics (i.e., a computer clock chip) or from the RF chain of the phone. We have 
several cellular phones that have been donated to us that we can carefully disassemble 
and probe to determine the source of these emissions.  
3. Determine the chip sets typically used in cellular phones and the likely spurious 
emissions generated from these chip sets. We can test a large number of cellular phone 
models, but we cannot test them all. Thus, if we can determine common electronics 
among different models, we may be able to reasonably extrapolate as to the likely success 
rate of this detection method for most models. 
4. Perform detection experiments within the most promising bands. Our experiment was 
performed in a metal box with an antenna close to the cellular phones. In this way, we 
were most likely to find spurious emissions from each phone. It will be necessary to 
determine bounds on standoff detection from these emissions. Fortunately, portal 
detection will require detection distances less than a few meters.  
5. Determine hardware requirements for a detection system. A hardware system will most 
likely have to scan over a frequency range using a sensitive detector with a narrow band 
filter. Sensitivity requirements, bandwidth requirements, and so forth, will allow us to 
estimate hardware costs and system feasibility. 
 
Alternative Path Forward 
 
Another potential path forward is also proposed, but will require additional testing to validate.  
This method involves sending a short RF pulse (within the cellular phone band) and listen for a 
two responses – the first response is from any RF reflecting material and a second response 
(slightly delayed) from the cellular phone filters used on all phones.   This approach has the 
potential to detect cellular phones whether they are ON or OFF or transmitting. 
 
Background 
 
Cell phones have become a very popular communication tool and have been used to surreptitiously gather 
sensitive information (Appendix A).  The need to restrict these devices from areas containing protected 
information has become apparent and requirements have been mandated.  These protection requirements 
have resulted in 100’s of security infractions in the national laboratories each year.  Savannah River, 
Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge have tested and begun installing a low-powered active RF tag called 
Rubee and a reader in a portal to perform this function.  Each cell phone user must attach one of 
these tags to his cellular telephone.  Sandia National Laboratory presented a technology for 
detecting cellular phones developed using their internal research and development funding.  
PNNL testing using a similar approach identified some weaknesses in the Sandia approach. 
 
Bechtel-Nevada conducted an evaluation of a representative sample of commercial cellular 
telephone detectors in 2003.  Sandia National Labs also conducted an evaluation of commercial 
cellular telephone detectors.  There summary finding was that none of the commercial products 
was effective in detecting cell phones when they are turned off, or if they are turned on and a 
phone call is not in progress. 
 
Testing Philosophy 
Mobile phones are highly mobile communications devices that perform an array of functions 
ranging from that of a simple digital organizer to that of a low-end personal computer. Designed 
for mobility, they are compact in size, battery powered, and lightweight. Most cell phones have a 
basic set of comparable features and capabilities. They house a microprocessor, read only 
memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), a radio module, a digital signal processor, a 
microphone and speaker, a variety of hardware keys and interfaces, and a liquid crystal display 
(LCD). The operating system (OS) of the device is held in ROM, which with the proper tools 
typically can be erased and reprogrammed electronically. For certain models, RAM may be used 
to store user data that is kept active by batteries; these data will be lost through failure or 
exhaustion of the batteries.  The tests below were designed to detect cellular phones and focusing 
on the microphone, speaker, and RF system as potential vulnerability entry points. 
RF Transmission Technique 
Each cell phone was placed in the bottom of a simple metal enclosure with a whip antenna about 
4” away.  The RF spectrum within the metal enclosure was measured for the duration of the test.  
In figures 1 – 7 below, the red signals standing alone are frequencies in which the cellular phone 
could be discriminated from the background signals: 
 Figure 1 - New LG Cell Phone 
 
The LG cellular phone had distinctive signals from 260MHz to 300MHz. 
 Figure 2 - New Motorola Cell Phone 
 
The Motorola cell phone had distinctive signals over the entire band. 
 Figure 3 - Old Samsung Cell Phone 
 
The Samsung cell phone had distinctive signals between 340MHz and 385MHz. 
  
Figure 4 - Motorola 550 
 
The Motorola 550 cell phone had several distinctive signals over the entire band. 
 
Figure 5 - Iphone 
 
Detecting the Iphone will require additional testing. 
  
Figure 6 -Older Nokia 
 
The older Nokia has one distinctive signal at 245MHz. 
 Figure 7 - No Device Lid Open 
  
This scan defines the technical approach that will be required to successfully determine if a cell 
phone is in the immediate area.  The red lines show signals that will need to be masked by the 
system so that the introduction of a cell phone can be detected.  It is proposed that a passive 
infrared detector be included in the system to detect the presence of a person at the entrance to a 
limited area.  Its function will be to cause the Cell Phone Detector to transition from 
measurement of the background signals into the cell phone detector mode.      
Cell Phone Testing Conducted 
Ten methods of detecting cellular phones were conducted – each attempting to exploit a set of 
cellular telephone features.  Cellular telephones actually have two speakers – one for the ringer 
and one for listening.  The ringer speaker has a much larger magnet.  A variety of tests were 
conducted to determine if these magnets could be reliably detected using eddy current 
instrumentation and “Hall Effect” sensors.  Neither of these tests achieved the desired results. 
 
The second effort scanned the RF frequency spectrum around the cellular phone.  This test was 
looking for the internal oscillators necessary to operate the microprocessor and RF synthesizer / 
mixer.  It was obvious from the absence of signal in the RF spectrum that the cellular phone 
designers had done a very good job meeting the electromagnetic interference specifications.   
 
A third effort involved the use of mm-wave holography and techniques similar to that used by 
non-linear junction detectors.  A sample test setup and image is shown below with red arrows 
connecting scanned objects to the objects themselves.  The cellular phones were OFF in these 
images. 
 
 
Figure 8 - mm-wave imaging technique 
 
A fourth set of tests involved detecting the transmitted RF from the cellular phone.  An “RF 
Signal Strength” meter was obtained along with an amplifier, mixer, and filter.  This technique 
had no difficulty in detecting the cellular phones as they periodically communicate with the 
cellular tower.  We began to investigate whether or not we could externally initiate the cellular 
phone to broadcast to the base station, but placed this effort on hold until after the Design 
Review. 
 
A fifth option was selected.  A commercial product was identified from a company called 
CellBusters.  They manufacture a device that continuously monitors for cellular phones, once it 
detects that a cell phone is switched on (up to 90 feet away) it will alert the phone user that they 
must switch off their phone.   All units are on back order and cost $755 each.  The CellBuster, 
when turned on, will continuously monitor for radio waves emitted from wireless 
communication devices. The device doesn't transmit and only receives signals, therefore is safe 
to use in areas sensitive to Cell phones and two-way radios. The unit can even detect Cell phones 
hidden in handbags and briefcases.  Unfortunately of the 5 reviews written, two units did not 
work. 
 
The sixth option involved combining RF and acoustic signals to detect the cellular phones. Three 
sets of tests were performed on 5/23/2007 to determine the technical feasibility of various 
approaches to identify if a person was carrying a cell phone into a limited area as a result on their 
oversight.  The Magnetic Coupling Test coupled magnetic energy into the cell phone and 
observing a response.  Second Harmonic Test used a modified second harmonic technique where 
the fundamental frequency was modulated at 3kHz.  Combined Audio and RF Test used an audio 
source and observed the detected RF response. 
 
Magnetic Coupling Test Setup. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Magnetic Coupling Test Setup - 28MHz Coils 
 
This test configuration was a frequency synthesizer driving one coil at 28MHz and the spectrum 
analyzer monitoring the output of the second coil.  The cell phone’s presence or position relative 
to either coil made no change in the observed signal from the second coil. 
 
Second Harmonic Test Setup 
 
Figure 10 - Second Harmonic Test Setup – Modified Non-Linear Junction Detector 
 
Second Harmonic Test was a modified version of how a non-linear junction detector operates.  
The horn antenna on the right was connected to two low-pass filters, then a 40dBm power 
amplifier, and then to a frequency synthesizer.  The small horn antenna on the left was directly 
connected to an RF spectrum analyzer.  The RF spectrum analyzer was configured to demodulate 
AM signals (similar to an AM radio). 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined Audio and RF Test Setup 
 
 
Figure 11 - Combined Audio and RF Test Setup – Acoustic Modulated RF Signal 
 
Combined Audio and RF Test replaced the AM Modulated RF Synthesizer used in Test #2 with 
an RF Synthesizer and removed the low pass filters.  (A continuous wave RF signal was used).  
The horn antenna on the right was connected to a 40dBm power amplifier, and then to a 
frequency synthesizer.  The small horn antenna on the left was directly connected to an RF 
spectrum analyzer.  The RF spectrum analyzer was configured to demodulate AM signals.  This 
test added an audio speaker (located between the antennas) to try to make the cell phone’s 
microphone (or speakers) react to the audio signal.  The RF transmitter and receiver would then 
be used to sense the cell phone reacting to the audio signal.   
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Magnetic Coupling Test Results 
 
Figure 12 - Typical Magnetic Coupling and Second Harmonic Test Results 
 
The spectrum analyzer shows a typical response from the 28MHz coils when the driven coil was 
modulated with 3kHz.  Unfortunately, the signal amplitude did not change as a result of the cell 
phone being in the field. 
 
Second Harmonic Test Results: 
The typical response from this was identical to response shown in Test #1.  A key observation 
was that the body presence could also make significant changes in the signal amplitude.  
Additional body distance from the antennas helped, but the presence of the cell phone did not 
create enough additional signal to mitigate body presence issues. 
 
Combined Audio and RF Test results are encouraging when they occur.  Power to the antenna 
was +30dBm (FCC specification) at 2.7GHz and the speaker was driven with 1Vpp at 2.5kHz and 
55dBSPL – normal speech is 70dB).  This is not too loud to have in an access area.  When no 
phone was present there was no signal present (see figure below).    This signal is the AM 
demodulated fundamental frequency.  I tried going higher in frequency, but that did not seem to 
help.  The phone definitely does not respond when shielded with my hand. 
 
Figure 13 - Combined Audio and RF Test Results 
 
 
 
Figure 14 - Combined Audio and RF Test RF Spectrum Analyzer Signal 
 
Seventh – Capacitive Sensor technique.  A sensor similar to the one shown below was used to 
detect the cellular telephone.  This sensor capacitively couples lower frequency energy from the 
phone into the sensor.  This actually worked pretty well when the cellular phone was ON and 
within a few inches of the sensor.  No external stimulus was used. 
 
 
Figure 4. Capacitive Sensor 
 
 
Eighth – active tags – since this is a commercial technology and has been demonstrated at 
Savannah River and Oak Ridge, no work has been done in this area so far.  PNNL does own a 
Rubee evaluation kit.  RuBee (IEEE P1902.1) is a two way radio tag protocol that uses Long 
Wave (LW) magnetic signals to send and receive data packets in a local regional network. The 
standard is in its final stages of approval by the IEEE.  However the protocol has been in 
commercial use in asset visibility systems and networks for several years.  RuBee radio tags are 
networked radiating transceivers, but operate at 131 kHz.  IEEE P1902.1 is the physical layer 
workgroup and was formed in late 2006 with the final specification expected early 2008.  
A typical RuBee Radio Tag - Has a 4 bit 
CPU, 1 Kbyte SRAM, crystal, and Li battery 
with expected life of five years.  A typical 
RuBee radio tag about 1" x 1" by .070", has 
a 4 bit CPU, 1-5 Kbytes SRAM, a clock, 
optional sensors, and can have displays and 
buttons. 
RuBee is a battery-powered, bidirectional, 
on-demand, peer-to-peer protocol and can 
operate at other frequencies.   This protocol 
functions successfully in harsh environments 
with networks of many thousands of tags and has a range of 3 to 100 feet depending on the 
antenna configuration. By 'harsh environments' is meant the ability to read and write data near 
steel or water. RuBee radio tags function in environments where other radio tags and RFID may 
have problems.
Summary Single Method Estimated Detection Chart 
Method Range  ON 
Range  
OFF 
Range 
Transmitting 
Cost 
Portal 
Cost 
Tag 
Reliable 
Reads 
Magnetic N/A N/A N/A  $0  
RF Spectra Test not Complete 
Test not 
Complete 
Test not 
Complete  $0  
mm-Wave 50 cm(1) 50 cm(1) 50 cm(1)  $0  
Phone RF 10 meters(4) N/A 10 meters(2)  $0  
Commercial N/A N/A 10 meters(3)  $0  
RF / Audio 1 cm(5) 1 cm(5) 1 cm(5)  $0  
Darwin 5 cm N/A 5 cm  $0  
Rubee Tags 1 meter(3) 1 meter(3) 1 meter(3)  $10  
Passive Tags 1-2 cm 1-2 cm 1-2 cm  $1  
Enhanced NLJD 50 cm 50 cm 50 cm  $1  
 
(1) All testing done at 50 centimeters.  This technique is in its early R&D stages. 
(2) Based on measured 0dBm transmitted signal level.  
(3) Based on specification sheet.  
(4) Technically possible to implement a “Base Station” and cause communications to initiate 
(5) Difficult to get consistent test results using this method 
 
Multiple Detection Method Approaches 
Method 1 – Combined Passive RFID Tag and Cell Phone – This method was tested during 
Rubee testing at Oak Ridge / Savannah River and found to be unreliable.  Measured detection 
range was only a few centimeters. 
 
Method 2 – Enhanced Non-linear Junction Detector (NLJD) Method.  This method added a very 
simple RFID tag (only a diode and the tag’s antenna) to the outside of the cell phone case and 
detection range was evaluated.  Good detection was measured out to about 50cm using test 
equipment with the phone ON or OFF.  We will need to work through antenna / phone 
orientation issues. 
 
Also considered were using magnetic or optical approach, but plausible implementations were 
not conceivable.  
Appendix A 
CellBusterSpecification
 

Appendix B   
Figure 16 (http://direct.xilinx.com/bvdocs/whitepapers/wp198.pdf) below shows a block diagram 
of a digital-type handset. 
 
 
Figure 5. Functional Components of a Digital Handset / Terminal 
 
Let’s simply look at sending and receiving audio. The microphone delivers audio signal to the 
A/D converter, creating a bit-stream. Fidelity and efficiency require redundancy elimination and 
compression. This is done in the speech coder (typically adaptive multirate). Forward Error 
Correction (FEC) occurs in the channel coder (Viterbi today, Turbo tomorrow). Coding adds 
back redundancy, but dropped bits can be recovered. CDMA channel spreading has been 
introduced in the U.S. and Korea, but others may use TDMA, SCDMA or WCDMA. The digital 
signal finally gets to the RF modulator and RF amplifier where it becomes one of several signal 
types (again, depending on the phone standard). At this point, it is analog. Today, these are in the 
gigahertz range and focused on octal phase shift keying. The duplexer is inserted to switch 
between receiving and sending at the antenna. 
 
On the receiving end, the signal hits the antenna, slides through the duplexer and is amplified and 
demodulated, becoming digital. The Rake Receiver “despreads” the received bits and forwards 
the signal to the channel decoder, which reconstructs the possibly corrupted digital signal and 
passes it on to the speech decoder. The speech decoder corrects bit-dropout and should resemble 
the digital version of the original analog signal. This forwards to the D/A converter, which, when 
filtered and amplified (not shown), drives the earphone. 
 
But Figure 16 lacks the key items for our application – an access point into the cell phone to 
wake it up for reception of an incoming call.  In the cases where the phone is ON, the GSM and 
UMTS systems use a Tree and Tabular Combined Notation to verify the protocol. 
 
 
Appendix C  Cellular Telephone Specifications 
 
• ANSI/TIA/EIA-41-D, Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem Operations, 
December, 1997. 
• ANSI/TIA/EIA-93-B, Cellular Radio Telecommunications Ai - Di InterfaceStandard, December, 1997. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-95-A, Mobile Station – Base Station Compatibility Standard for Dual-Mode Wideband 
Spread Spectrum Cellular Systems; Telecommunications Industry Association; May 1995. 
• TSB74, Support for 14.4 kbps Data Rates and PCS Interaction for Wideband Spread Spectrum Cellular 
Systems, December, 1995. 
• ANSI J-STD-008, Personal Station - Base Station Compatibility Requirements for 1.8 to 2.0 Ghz Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) Personal Communications Systems.  
• TIA/EIA-124-B, Wireless Radio Telecommunications Intersystem Non-Signaling Data 
Communications DMH (Data Message Handler); Telecommunications Industry Association; July 1999. 
• TIA/EIA IS-136.1-A, TDMA Cellular/PCS - Radio Interface - Mobile Station —Base Station 
Compatibility - Digital Control Channel, Rev. A, October 1996. 
• TIA/EIA IS-136.2-A, TDMA Cellular/PCS - Radio Interface - Mobile Station —Base Station 
Compatibility - Traffic Channels and FSK Control Channel, Rev. A, October 1996. 
• EIA/TIA/IS-553, Mobile Station - Land Station Compatibility Specification; September 1989. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-634, MSC - BS Interface for Public Mobile 800 MHz, December 1995. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-634-A, MSC - BS Interface for Public Wireless Communications Systems, (to be published 
tbd). 
• TSB80, MSC - BS Interface for Public 800 MHz, October 1996. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-658, Data Services Interworking Function Interface for Wideband Spread Spectrum 
Systems, 1996. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-737, IS-41-C Enhancements to Support Circuit Mode Services, (approved for publication). 
• TIA/EIA/IS-683-A, Over-The-Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations In Spread Spectrum 
Systems, February 1997. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-725-A, Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem Operations - Over-The-Air Service 
Provisioning (OTASP) & Parameter Administration (OTAPA), July 1999. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-756-A, TIA/EIA-41-D Enhancements for Wireless Number Portability Phase II, December 
1998. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-771, Wireless Intelligent Network, July 1999. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-820, Removable User Identity Module (R-UIM) for TIA/EIA Spread Spectrum Standards, 
March 2000. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-839, R-UIM Overview, Operation and File Structure Support in TIA/EIA-136-A, June 9, 
2000. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-841, Network Based Enhancements for User Identity Module (UIM), August, 2000. 
• TIA/EIA/IS-2000, Inter-Operability Specification (IOS) for CDMA 2000 Access Network Interfaces, 
2000. 
• TIA/EIA/J-STD-025, Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance, 2000. 
• TIA/EIA/J-STD-036, Wireless Enhanced Emergency Services, 2000. 
